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Can Debtors Disclaim Inheritances to the Detriment
of Their Creditors?
Stephen E. Parker*
I. INTRODUCTION
Debtors are motivated to renounce or disclaim' property to which
they become entitled, whether by bequest, devise, or inheritance, in
order to shield the property from creditors and avoid taxes.2 Although
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19783 specifically attempts to prevent
the first of these questionable practices, state common law has permit-
ted disclaimers for two reasons. First, because a gift4 is a two-party
* Associate, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Atlanta, Georgia.
B.S.B.A., Washington University St. Louis, 1989; J.D., Emory University, 1992.
1. A renunciation is an heir's refusal to accept an estate, either in whole or in part,
which devolves to that heir by intestacy. A disclaimer is a devisee's refusal to accept an
estate, either in whole or in part, which the devisee becomes entitled to by testate suc-
cession; that is, through a will left by the decedent. See generally WILLIAM M.
McGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES (1988) (discussing the concepts of
renunciation and disclaimer in greater detail). These terms are used interchangeably
throughout this Article. Although heirs and devisees were treated differently under the
common law doctrine of descent cast, the doctrine has been supplanted by statute in all
but two states. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 587, 596 n.49 (1989). Under this doctrine, property vested in an heir at the death
of the decedent regardless of the accompanying burdens. See infra notes 4-6 and accom-
panying text. If an heir wished to refuse the property, by disclaimer or otherwise, the act
was deemed a post-inheritance "transfer" and did not relieve the heir of obligations thrust
upon him by the inheritance. In contrast, a devisee was allowed to disclaim all interests
devised to him. This disclaimer was said to "relate-back" to the date of the testator's
death, and the devisee was deemed to have received nothing. See infra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Estate of Oot, 408 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1978). Debtors
may also have legitimate reasons to renounce or disclaim legacies. For example, one
sibling may disclaim her disproportionate share so that all siblings take equal shares in
the estate. Where the disclaimant is or has become bankrupt, however, the usual purpose
of disclaiming is to defeat creditors.
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in various sections of 11
U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended in
various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified as amended in various sec-
tions of 11 U.S.C.) [hereinafter the Code].
4. In this example, the gift is in the form of a bequest or devise.
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transaction, it requires the donee's acceptance as the law does not re-
quire a party to accept an unwanted gift.5 For example, a donee may
want to reject a gift of property when the property is encumbered in an
amount greater than its fair market value6 or when accepting the gift
would impose a significant tax burden on the recipient. Second, if the
law did not allow disclaimers, the testator's property could end up in
the hands of the devisee's creditors, thus clearly frustrating the testa-
tor's intent.7
Litigation arises in both the bankruptcy and state law contexts where
a devisee disclaims property when he has outstanding debts that he is
otherwise unable to satisfy. The central issue in this litigation is
whether the disclaimer is a fraudulent transfer8 that creditors can set
aside.
Part II of this Article discusses the background of disclaimer law.
Part III examines post-petition disclaimers, which are prohibited under
section 541(a)(5) of the Code. 9 Part IV analyzes pre-petition dis-
claimers and concludes that, because they may be analogized to general
powers of appointment, pre-petition disclaimers are fraudulent trans-
fers under section 548 of the Code.' °
II. BACKGROUND
The idea that the law should not allow individuals to defraud their
creditors by conveying their property is a long-standing proposition.
5. This principle is derived from English common law. See, e.g., Townson v.
Tickell, 106 Eng. Rep. 575, 576-577 (K.B. 1819) ("The law certainly is not so absurd as
to force a man to take an estate against his will."); Thompson v. Leach, 86 Eng. Rep.
391, 396 (K.B. 1690) ("[Mlan cannot have an estate put into him in spight of his
teeth.").
6. See UNIF. PROBATE. CODE § 2-609, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983) [hereinafter U.P.C.] ("A spe-
cific devise passes subject to any mortgage interest existing at the date of death .... ");
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6170 (West 1986) ("A specific devise passes the property devised
subject to any mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien existing at the date of death .... ").
The problem of encumbered property is not at issue in this context because no creditor
would demand acceptance where the property had no net value or was subject to a superior
claim.
7. In situations where a testator has died having accumulated more liabilities than as-
sets, however, the interests of the devisee, not the testator, should be weighed against
those of the creditors because the testator has died, and it is the devisee's interests that
are currently at stake.
8. A "fraudulent transfer" occurs when a debtor transfers property to a third party
within one year of the date on which the debtor files a petition for bankruptcy. To make
a "fraudulent transfer," the debtor must either intend to "defraud" his creditors or must re-
ceive property of a disproportionately lesser value in exchange. See infra notes 67-70
and accompanying text; see also infra part IV.C-G.
9. See infra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 67-93, 105-89 and accompanying text.
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As early as 1571, the Statute of Elizabeth" rendered such transfers
void. In an early application of this statute, one court noted various
"badges of fraud,"'2 which, if present, would render a transfer clearly
and "utterly void."'3 Section 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act codified the essence of the Statute of Elizabeth by providing that
"[e]very conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual
intent ... to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future credi-
tors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors."a The lan-
guage of section 548(a) of the Code reflects this history. 5
In a bankruptcy case, state disclaimer statutes and the Code compose
the statutory authority that controls the disposition of disclaimed prop-
erty. In determining whether to classify a disclaimer as a fraudulent
transfer, courts must resolve whether the disclaimant had an interest in
the property devised to her and whether the disclaimant transferred that
interest through the disclaimer. 6
A. State Law Cases
With few exceptions, 17 courts applying state law have held that a
11. Statute of Eliz., 1571, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (Eng.).
12. Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 811 n.B (K.B. 1601); see also cases cited infra
notes 148, 155.
13. Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 810 n.B (quoting 13 Eliz., Ch. 5, § 2).
14. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1985) [hereinafter
U.F.C.A.]. The current version of this statute is the UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §
4, 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985).
15. The language in § 548 of the Code is nearly identical to that found in § 7 of the
U.F.C.A. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) provides in part:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property...
that was made ... on or within one year before the date of the filing of the pe-
tition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily--
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the
date that such transfer was made ... indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer ... and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made ... or became in-
solvent as a result of such transfer ....
11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988).
16. Many courts have not reached the second question because if the disclaimant had
no interest in the property, there is nothing left to transfer. See Jones v. Atchison (In
re Atchison), 925 F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 178 (1991);
see also infra note I l I and accompanying text.
17. Courts will set aside a disclaimer if: (1) the disclaimant previously accepted the
gift; (2) the disclaimant and the ultimate recipient colluded; or (3) the devisee has caused
his creditors to rely on his acceptance. See generally, Note, Right of Creditors of
Testamentary Donee to Set Aside His Renunciation, 37 MICH. L. REV. 1168 (1939); 93
A.L.R.2d 8 (1964). Historically, most state statutes required that the disclaimant make
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disclaimer is not a fraudulent transfer" even if it frustrates the dis-
claimant's creditors.' 9 Reasoning that under state disclaimer statutes
the disclaimer "relates back"'2 to the date of the testator's death, courts
have concluded that no property interest vested in the disclaimant and
that the property then passed to an alternate taker as if the disclaimant
predeceased the testator.2' As a result, creditors have not been able to
attach property that the law deems the debtor not to have, and by
operation of law, never had.
B. Bankruptcy Cases
One of the Code's primary policies is fairness to all creditors.2 By
filing a petition for bankruptcy, a debtor avails himself of certain pro-
tections set forth in the Code. 23 Thus, courts must be cautious not to
extend to debtors greater protection than that to which they are statu-
torily entitled.
A debtor may disclaim a devise during either the post- or pre-petition
periods. A change in the language of section 541(a)(5) has resolved
the disclaimer within a "reasonable time." U.P.C. § 2-801 cmt. b. Currently, however,
most state statutes provide specific time limits. For example, both U.P.C. § 2-801(b)(1)
and Internal Revenue Code § 2518 (1992) impose a nine-month time limit if the dis-
claimant wants to avoid a transfer tax. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
18. General Fin. Corp. v. Hansen (In re Estate of Hansen), 248 N.E.2d 709, 712 (I11.
App. Ct. 1969); McGarry v. Mathis, 282 N.W. 786, 790 (Iowa 1938); Bradford v.
Calhoun, 109 S.W. 502, 504 (Tenn. 1908).
19. In re Estate of Scrivani, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding
that a devisee "may freely renounce a testate or intestate disposition for any reason or no
reason, even if the renunciation has the effect, or indeed the object, of frustrating credi-
tors"); see also Estate of Schiffman, 430 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1980)
(holding that an insolvent devisee may renounce an inheritance even if otherwise unable
to satisfy her creditors' claims).
20. Courts use the legal fiction of relation back when property passes from a decedent
to a devisee. This fiction allows the concepts of "offer and acceptance" to co-exist with
the common law "notion of instantaneous transfer of title to the grantee." Hirsch, supra
note 1, at 592. The law of relation back presumes that a devisee has accepted until she
either actually accepts or disclaims. Id. If the devisee disclaims, the disclaimer "relates
back" and "the devisee's 'inchoate' title vanishe[s] retroactively." Id.; see also infra note
166 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit has had occasion to discuss the doc-
trine of relation back, and has commented that "[a]lthough there is a presumption that a
beneficiary accepts a testamentary gift, a valid disclaimer overcomes this presumption
and retroactively erases any interest in the beneficiary disclaiming." Atchison, 925
F.2d at 211.
21. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-801; IND. CODE ANN. § 32-3-2-2 (Burns 1990); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3A: 25-45 (West 1989).
22. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97 (explaining that the purpose of the automatic stay provi-
sion under § 362 is to protect the interests of all creditors).
23. These protections include the automatic stay on creditors imposed by § 362 and
the discharge of indebtedness granted by § 727.
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some of the conflict concerning the disposition of assets during the
post-petition period. Section 541(a)(5) now defines "property of the
estate" to include property which the debtor "becomes entitled to ac-
quire" by bequest, devise or inheritance within 180 days after the filing
of a petition. 24 Courts have interpreted this provision to include dis-
claimed property, thus giving effect to the specific Code language and
refusing to respect relation-back provisions in state disclaimer
statutes.
Although section 541(a)(5) has settled the law as it pertains to post-
petition disclaimers, the law dealing with pre-petition disclaimers is
still in dispute. Section 548 empowers a trustee to avoid the transfer of
any "interest of the debtor in property" that satisfies the conditions of a
fraudulent transfer.26 The Code, however, does not define "interest,"
and because there is no federal law of property, state law must govern
the definition. Nonetheless, because bankruptcy proceedings operate
under federal law, allowing section 541 to define the interest of the
debtor would be a better approach and would yield more consistent re-
sults. Courts should therefore not allow pre-petition disclaimants to
use the state-created legal fiction of relation back to deny creditors the
opportunity to satisfy their claims from the disclaimed property.
III. POST-PETITION DISCLAIMERS
In an early bankruptcy case, Justice Story stated that the law pre-
sumes acceptance until a contrary intent is shown, at which time a re-
jection becomes effective.28 According to Justice Story, however, a
debtor who has filed for bankruptcy has "no right to disclaim or re-
nounce [for] .... [i]t would be a fraud upon his creditors .... As an
honest debtor he must desire, that his creditors should derive as much
benefit from all his 'rights in property,' as is possible. 29
The current language of the Code reflects the theory that debtors
24. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (1988). See infra notes 30, 36-37 for a more thorough dis-
cussion of § 541 and its predecessor.
25. See cases cited infra notes 51, 62, 63.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988). Section 548 specifies the conditions under which the
Code defines a transfer as fraudulent. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
27. The Supreme Court has commented that the Bankruptcy Code "does not define
what constitutes an interest in property. Absent a federal provision to the contrary, a
debtor's interest in property is determined by applicable state law." Atchison, 925 F.2d
at 210 (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)). Section 541, however,
is a federal provision that may provide a definition of "interest in property" in the
disclaimer context. See infra notes 56-65, 129-36, 138 and accompanying text.
28. Ex parte Fuller, 9 F. Cas. 976, 977 (C.C. Mass. 1842) (No. 5147) (Justice Story's
statement was dicta, as there was no actual renunciation in the case.).
29. Id.
1993]
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cannot use post-petition disclaimers to shield assets from creditors.
Under section 301, the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates "property
of the estate" as defined in section 541.30 Section 541(a)(1) provides
in part that "property of the estate" includes "all legal or equitable inter-
ests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."
31
The trustee controls all the debtor's incidents of ownership to facilitate
an effective liquidation of the debtor's property.32
Although the definition of "property" for purposes of a bankruptcy
proceeding is a matter of federal law, 33 "the existence and nature of the
debtor's interest in property . . . are determined by nonbankruptcy
law."3 4 Nonetheless, post-petition disclaimer cases 35 indicate that the
drafters of the Code may have promulgated a federal law of property.
Section 541(a)(5) provides in part that "property of the estate" includes
"[a]ny interest in property ... that the debtor acquires or becomes
entitled to acquire within 180 days" of the filing of the petition,
whether "by bequest, devise, or inheritance," or "as a beneficiary of a
life insurance policy or of a death benefit plan."36 This provision dif-
fers from the language of section 70a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, which provided that "[a]ll property . . . which vests in the
bankrupt within six months after bankruptcy by bequest, devise or in-
"37heritance shall vest in the trustee ....
The vesting requirement gave rise to a result contrary to the Act's
30. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
3 1. This provision, which is intended to be construed broadly, is a major departure
from the definition of "property of the estate" under § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) [hereinafter the Act], the predecessor to § 541 of the Code.
Under § 541, title to the debtor's property does not vest in the trustee, as it did under §
70a, but instead is included in the estate as an "interest of the debtor." In addition, §
70a(5) vested in the trustee all property that the debtor "could by any means have trans-
ferred or which might have been levied upon" by his creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §
1 I0(a)(5) (1976). These requirements have been supplanted by the broad language of §
541, thus reducing the need for courts to rely on state law to determine the kind of prop-
erty that the debtor can transfer or upon which creditors can levy. See 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 541.02 [1-2], at 541-10-15 & n.1 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993).
32. In Chapter It and Chapter 13 cases, the court may appoint a trustee to prevent the
debtor from misusing or improperly depleting the "property of the estate" where the
debtor's business continues to operate. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1302 (1988).
33. See infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text.
34. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541.02 [1], at 541-10.1 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th
ed. 1993).
35. See cases cited infra notes 51, 62-63.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A), (C) (1988) (emphasis added).
37. See 11 U.S.C. § l10(a)(8) (1976). The Act is the predecessor to the Code.
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purpose of fairness to creditors.38 In In re Detlefsen, 9 the Eighth
Circuit held that property disclaimed after the filing of the petition did
not vest in the debtor by virtue of the state relation-back provision.4°
In Detlefsen, six and one-half weeks before the debtor filed a voluntary
petition for bankruptcy, the debtor's mother died, entitling him to per-
sonalty that had been held in trust for his mother.4 Seven months
later, the debtor attempted to disclaim the personalty, so that the prop-
erty would have passed to his children.42 The Illinois disclaimer
statute then in effect43 provided that the disclaimer would "relate back
for all purposes to the date of death of the decedent, [or] the date of
death of the donee ''44 and thus would prevent the devise from vesting
in the debtor.45 The district court found, however, that "permitting
state law to provide definition of the language in § 70a, 2 unduly re-
stricts operation of the section and circumscribes congressional in-
tent." 46  Thus, the court did not allow the debtor to disclaim the
property and thereby determine its recipient.4 7
Finding the district court's reasoning unpersuasive, the appellate
court reversed, holding that state law defines property interests and that
a disclaimant's motive is irrelevant so long as he does not receive a
benefit from the disclaimer.48 The Eighth Circuit found that in enacting
section 70a(2), Congress did not intend a trustee to have the power to
38. See, e.g., Caplinger v. Patty, 398 F.2d 471, 475 (8th Cir. 1968) ("Section 60 of
the Bankruptcy Act is designed to give all creditors fair treatment.").
39. Mickelson v. Detlefsen (In re Detlefsen), 610 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'g 466
F. Supp. 161 (D. Minn. 1979).
40. Detlefsen, 610 F.2d at 518-20.
41. Mickelson v. Detlefsen (In re Detlefsen), 466 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Minn.
1979).
42. Id.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 2-7(e) (1977).
44. Id.
45. Detlefsen, 466 F. Supp. at 164.
46. Id. Accordingly, the district court cited Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10
(1923) for the proposition that state law "remains subordinate to the federal policies that
inhere in the Bankruptcy Act." Detlefsen, 466 F. Supp. at 163. The district court further
quoted from the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson that "'when the language of
Congress indicates a policy requiring a broader construction of the statute than the state
decisions would give it, federal courts cannot be concluded by them."' Id. (quoting
Johnson, 264 U.S. at 10). Use of disclaimer in the bankruptcy context frustrates con-
gressional intent because its exercise is so predictable Id. at 166 n.7.
47. Detlefsen, 466 F. Supp. at 166-67. The district court stated, "[the debtor has]
such complete control over the property . . . that it is hard to distinguish him from an
owner. It is tempting to make him be just before he is generous." Id. at 165-66 n.6. See
also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. 25, p. 1813 (1940). For a discussion of general
powers of appointment, see infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
48. Detlefsen, 610 F.2d at 515, 520; see also supra note 19.
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accept a devise on the debtor's behalf.49 The court noted, however,
that had it decided the case under the Code, it might have reached a dif-
ferent result.5°
Courts that have reviewed the issue under the Code have in fact
reached the different result referred to by the Detlefsen court. In In re
Watson,5' for example, the debtor disclaimed the death proceeds of her
father's life insurance policy two and one-half months after she filed
for bankruptcy, with the knowledge that the property would pass to
other family members. Concluding that the trustee could set aside the
transfer under section 549,3 the bankruptcy court applied a four-part
test.54 First, there must be a "transfer," which section 101(54) defines
as "every mode, direct or indirect, voluntary or involuntary, of dispos-
ing of or parting with property or with an interest in property., 55
Citing In re Peery,56 the court concluded that the disclaimer was a vol-
untary transfer of the right to receive the proceeds.57
Second, the Watson court inquired whether the disclaimed proceeds
constituted "property of the estate."5 8 The court reasoned that the lan-
guage, "becomes entitled to acquire," in section 541(a)(5) clearly
avoids any reference to the word "vest," and thus gives the trustee the
49. Detlefsen, 610 F.2d at 520. If the devise had been of realty, however, under §
70a(7) the power would have vested in the trustee as it was a "power in the bankrupt to
acquire assignable interests" in real property. Id. Thus, the court reasoned that Congress
knew how to protect creditors, and its failure to provide similar protection in § 70a(2)
gave rise to an inference that it did not intend to override state law. Id.
50. Id. The new language of the Code "almost certainly" would obviate the problem
presented in the case. Id. Although the case was decided in 1979, one year after the Code
was enacted, the relevant events occurred while the Act was the controlling law.
51. Geekie v. Watson (In re Watson), 65 B.R. 9 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986).
52. Id. at 10.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) provides in part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid a transfer of property of the estate-
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and...
(2)(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.
11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1988).
54. Watson, 65 B.R. at 11. Part three of the test, whether the transfer occurred after
commencement, and part four, whether the court or the Bankruptcy Code authorized the
transfer, were not at issue in the case. Id.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1988).
56. Nashville City Bank & Trust Co. v. Peery (In re Peery), 40 B.R. 811 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1984). For a more thorough discussion of Peery, see infra notes 155-71 and
accompanying text.
57. Watson, 65 B.R. at 12. For further discussion of the meaning of the word "trans-
fer," see infra notes 69, 113-16, 143-46 and accompanying text.
58. Watson, 65 B.R. at 11.
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"power" to acquire property devised to a debtor.5 9 Moreover, the court
noted that because section 541(a)(5)(C) "specifically states that the
right to receive the proceeds of an insurance policy is an interest in
property," the language of the Code grants to the estate and the trustee
the power to accept the gift on behalf of the creditors. 6° Therefore, be-
cause federal bankruptcy law controls and section 541(a)(5) super-
sedes the right to renounce, the debtor loses her entire interest once she
files a bankruptcy petition, including the power to disclaim.6'
In two other cases, In re Lewis62 and In re Cornell,63 the courts also
relied on the explicit language of section 541 in concluding that a be-
quest becomes property of the bankruptcy estate. 64 The Lewis court
held that because "federal law is supreme on this issue [it] ... requires
return of the bequest to the estate." 65 Thus, the language of the Code
evidences congressional intent to secure for the trustee the power to
accept the devise on behalf of the creditors and to preclude the debtor
from exercising the power to disclaim. A more difficult situation arises
when the debtor disclaims prior to filing a petition for bankruptcy, and
the trustee must proceed on a theory of "fraudulent transfer."
IV. PRE-PETITION DISCLAIMERS
Current case law holds that if a debtor files for bankruptcy prior to
disclaiming, the property becomes "property of the estate" by operation
59. Id. at 11-12.
60. Id. at 12. It appears that Congress has created a federal law of property, supersed-
ing state law and giving someone other than the debtor the power to accept property.
Congress does, in fact, have such a power under Article I of the U.S. Constitution. See
Detlefsen, 610 F.2d at 516 n.14 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
61. Watson, 65 B.R. at 12. The court noted that the Illinois disclaimer statute and the
legal fiction of relation back do not change the fact that the debtor "became 'entitled to
acquire"' the proceeds within the requisite time frame and cannot be used to "defeat the
express definition of property of the estate contained in the Bankruptcy Code." Id. See
infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
62. Flanigan v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 45 B.R. 27 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
63. Cornelius v. Cornell (In re Cornell), 95 B.R. 219 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989).
64. Lewis, 45 B.R. at 29-30 n.2 (holding that the debtor's disclaimer in favor of his
daughter five months after filing his petition was an avoidable transfer under § 549);
Cornell, 95 B.R. at 221-22 (holding that under § 549 a creditor could set aside a debtor's
disclaimer because the debtor's mother died, leaving him property by will, within 180
days from the date of confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 12 plan).
65. Lewis, 45 B.R. at 29-30 n.2; accord Cornell, 95 B.R. at 222 ("Federal Bankruptcy
law, and not state probate or succession law, governs the issue raised herein . . . . The
disclaimer filed by debtors thereafter, whether or not valid under Oklahoma law, consti-
tuted an unauthorized post-petition transfer of property of the estate which is avoidable
by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 549."). Section 550 requires the return of the legacy or
bequest to the bankruptcy estate by the alternate taker. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988).
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of section 541(a)(5) and is therefore subject to claims of creditors. 66 It
is unclear, however, whether a different result is appropriate when a
debtor disclaims during the pre-petition period, that is, prior to filing a
petition for bankruptcy, or whether the result should be the same be-
cause the pre-petition disclaimer is a fraudulent transfer. For example,
if a debtor files for bankruptcy on July 1 and disclaims on July 3, the
property is "property of the estate" under section 541(a)(5). Should
the result be different if the debtor filed the disclaimer on June 29 or
September 1 of the preceding year, or should the result be the same be-
cause the pre-petition disclaimer is a fraudulent transfer?
Section 548 defines "fraudulent transfer" and provides two tests for
determining whether a transfer is fraudulent.67 Both tests have two re-
quirements: (1) there must be a "transfer;" and (2) the transfer must be
of "an interest of the debtor in property. ' 68 Two courts have held that
the act of disclaiming is itself a "transfer" as defined in section 101(54)
of the Code.69 If the relation-back provision in a state statute prevents
the debtor from acquiring an "interest in property," however, then the
debtor had nothing to transfer, and the disclaimer cannot have been a
fraudulent transfer. Therefore, to determine if a disclaimer is a fraudu-
lent transfer depends on whether "an interest in property" is defined by
section 541(a)(5) of the Code or state law. 70
A. Analogy of Disclaimers to General Powers of Appointment
If a debtor's disclaimer was always considered a fraudulent transfer
under state law, every case would yield a consistent result. Currently,
however, a majority of states hold that the debtor's motives are irrele-
vant and allow individuals to disclaim and defeat creditors' claims.7
One potential solution to this problem is for courts to treat the debtor
66. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
67. For the text of § 548, see supra note 15.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988).
69. See Casciato v. Stevens (In re Stevens), 112 B.R. 175, 177 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1989); Nashville City Bank & Trust Co. v. Peery (In re Peery), 40 B.R. 81, 814 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1984). Although a disclaimer may not technically be a transfer "directly" to
the alternate taker under the will, it is at least a relinquishment of a right to receive prop-
erty, and that seems to be "a mode, direct or indirect" of parting with an interest in
property. One commentator believes it is not a transfer but a denial of a benefit to the
debtor. See, Dean David Gamin, Renunciation of Testamentary Benefit as Fraudulent
Transfer, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 148, 164-65 (1986).
70. The disclaimer must, of course, also satisfy the other requirements of a fraudulent
transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
71. See, e.g., Mickelson v. Detlefsen (In re Detlefsen), 610 F.2d 512, 515, 520 (8th
Cir. 1979); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text. A minority of states prohibit
insolvent disclaimers by statute. See infra notes 140-41.
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disclaimant in the same way that they treat a debtor who has a general
power of appointment.72 Generally, creditors have some access to
assets subject to a general power of appointment.73
Justice Traynor raised the analogy between a disclaimer and a
general power of appointment in In re Kalt's Estate.74 In discussing
the power associated with a disclaimer, he stated that the power to de-
termine the ultimate disposition of property "is essentially analogous to
a general power of appointment under a will." 75 Assets under an un-
exercised general power of appointment, exercisable inter-vivos,76 can
be subject to claims of the debtor's creditors.77 In some jurisdictions,
this is true only to the extent that other property available to satisfy the
debtor's creditors is insufficient.78 Under common law, creditors
could not reach the appointive property because of the distinction be-
tween a power and ownership; until the donee exercised the power of
appointment, 79 he or she had not accepted sufficient control over the
assets to constitute ownership. 80 To protect creditors, however, states
have adopted statutes that supplant this distinction.8' Justice Traynor
asserted that a creditor's interest in disclaimed property should receive
equal protection.82
This analogy seems persuasive; why should we permit the legal fic-
tion of relation back, a fiction created for a different purpose,83 to en-
able a devisee to shield assets from creditors through use of a
disclaimer? Those unconvinced by the analogy criticize attempts to
72. A power of appointment is an "authority, other than as an incident of the benefi-
cial ownership of property, to designate recipients of beneficial interests in property."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.1 (1986). A "general
power," as distinguished from a "non-general power," authorizes the recipient or holder
of the power to exercise the power in favor of himself, much in the same way that a de-
visee can accept property left to him under a will. See MCGOVERN, supra note 1, at §
12.1.
73. See infra notes 77-81.
74. Kalt v. Youngworth (In re Kalt's Estate), 108 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1940).
75. Id. at 403.
76. The general power of appointment can be exercised while the holder of the power
is alive. In contrast, a testamentary power is exercisable only through the holder's will.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.2 (1986); N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-7.2 (McKinney 1992).
78. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1390.3 (West 1982); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 556.123
(West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 502.70 (West 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 299.9
(1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 702.17 (West 1981).
79. The donee could, for example, accept property left under a will.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.2 cmt. a (1986).
81. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
82. Kalt's Estate, 108 P.2d at 403.
83. See supra note 20.
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limit the debtor's ability to disclaim.8 4 Though they concede that dis-
claimer constitutes a 'power' to transfer similar to a general power of
appointment, they argue that the power is limited because the property
descends to the disclaimant or to a person that the disclaimant does not
choose.85 These critics rely on Estate of Schiffman, 6 in which the
court reasoned that it was the disclaimer statute and the will, rather than
the disclaimant, that determined the ultimate recipient of the property. 7
This argument is unpersuasive because the disclaimant does choose the
ultimate recipient of the property, he only has to make the choice from
a smaller pool of people. The property will pass either to himself or to
the alternate taker. 88 In situations involving a post-petition disclaimer,
the courts find this "limited power" sufficient to bring the disclaimed
assets within the "property of the estate. "89
The choice of the ultimate recipient of the property, however, is not
the crucial factor in concluding that the property subject to a general
power of appointment should be included in the debtor's estate.
Instead, the debtor's power to appoint the property to himself9° is the
key factor, as it should be in the disclaimer context. This factor gives
rise to the different treatment of general and non-general powers of
appointment: non-general powers are never subject to the claims of
creditors because the holder of the power cannot appoint the property
to himself, and the property therefore is not considered his asset.9'
Both the critics 92 and the Schiffman court have overlooked the purpose
behind this differing treatment.
The Code implicitly provides for the inclusion of general powers of
appointment in "property of the estate" as defined in section
84. See, e.g., Gamin, supra note 69, at 157.
85. Id.
86. 430 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1980).
87. Id. at 231.
88. Once a will has been admitted to probate, it becomes a matter of public record.
The potential disclaimant can therefore determine who will be the alternate taker. In the
case of intestate succession, the disclaimant can determine who will be the alternate
taker by examining the state intestacy provisions.
89. See supra notes 57, 61-63 and accompanying text.
90. To be classified as a general power, the donee of the power must be able to ap-
point the property to himself, his creditors, his estate, or the creditors of his estate. See
infra note 93.
91. Section 541(b)(1) removes from the estate only those assets subject to a non-
general power of appointment because the holder of a non-general power, the debtor in
this context, cannot exercise the power for his own benefit. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1)
(1988).
92. See generally Gamin, supra note 69.
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541(b)(1). 93 Because the Code authorizes the trustee to control the
property of the estate, 94 the trustee may exercise the debtor's power of
appointment in favor of the creditors. In the disclaimer context, the
debtor possesses a 'power' which he can exercise for his own benefit.
Thus, although the debtor's alternate appointees may consist of a
group of one, the disclaiming debtor still chooses, and will choose to
deprive his creditors of the benefits of his inheritance or bequest. The
Code speaks not in terms of "general powers" but merely "powers,"
and a disclaimer clearly falls within this category.
B. A Disclaimer as a "Benefit" by Virtue of a Disclaimant's Release
From the Obligation of Child Support
Under both section 541 and state disclaimer statutes, a disclaimant is
not allowed to "benefit" by virtue of her disclaimer.95 In the typical
disclaimer case, the property passes to the disclaimant's children.96
States impose a statutory obligation to support one's children finan-
cially.97 Therefore, if the parent can pass property to her children
through the use of a disclaimer and thereby be relieved of her child
support obligation, she has received a benefit.98 The majority of
states, however, hold a parent liable for child support, notwithstand-
ing, and without resort to, the child's own funds. 99 There are two
exceptions to the majority position. °° First, a parent who is
93. Section 541(b)(1) provides that property of the estate does not include "any
power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (1988). Therefore, if the debtor can exercise a power in
favor of himself, the power is included within property of the estate. See also 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 541.21, at p. 541-106-110 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.6 cmt. c (1986) ("The
Bankruptcy estate does include general powers of the [debtor] that are presently exercis-
able because they inherently are exercisable for the benefit of the [debtor].").
94. II U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1988).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988); U.P.C. § 2-801(d)(l)(iii) (when there is a benefit to the
disclaimant, the disclaimer will be set aside).
96. See, e.g., Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 925 F.2d 209, 210 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 178 (1991); Hoecker v. United Bank of Boulder, 476 F.2d 838,
841 (10th Cir. 1973); Stevens, 112 B.R. at 176.
97. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 6.2 (2d ed. 1988).
98. See Detlefsen, 610 F.2d at 520 ("The fact that the bankrupt is in any case himself
kept from benefiting at the expense of his creditors still serves to prevent the sort of
'fraud upon the [Code]' with which Congress was concerned .... "); see also supra notes
39-49 and accompanying text.
99. See generally Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Income of Child from Other Source As
Excusing Parent's Compliance with Support Provisions of Divorce Decree, 39 A.L.R.3d
1292, 1295 (1971).
100. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Custodians, Incompetents, Trustees and Others: Taxable
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financially unable to meet her obligation is allowed to use the child's
resources to satisfy her support obligation.'0 ' Disclaimants who are
insolvent or bankrupt are particularly likely to fall under this exception.
A second exception exists where a trust instrument provides that the
trustee should distribute the income and/or principal of the trust in lieu
of a parent's support obligation. 0 2 Moreover, courts in at least one
jurisdiction have interpreted a state statute to either partially abate or
wholly eliminate a parent's support obligation when a child has her
own funds. 10 3 Thus, when property passes to a debtor's child instead
of to the debtor, the debtor receives a benefit, and the disclaimer
should be invalid."" Even if the debtor's support obligation is not dis-
charged, the debtor has still derived a benefit because her children will
enjoy the property. However, courts have not applied this reasoning
in the bankruptcy context.
C. Pre-1978 Code Pre-Petition Cases
Currently, courts are split on whether state or federal law should
define "interest in property." In the seminal pre-Code case of Hoecker
v. United Bank of Boulder,10 5 the debtor, a devisee under his father's
will, disclaimed his interest one week before the state statutory pe-
riod 0 6 expired, causing the property to pass to his daughter. 0 7 The
debtor was insolvent except for the property and received no consid-
eration for the disclaimer. 108 He filed for bankruptcy within one year
Powers of Appointment?, INST. ON EST. PLAN. I 1602.3(b) (1981).
101. See Doelp v. Doelp, 281 A.2d 721, 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (dicta).
102. See Nielsen v. Nielsen, 462 P.2d 512, 517 (Idaho 1969).
103. McElrath v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 189 S.E.2d 49, 52-53 (Ga. 1972)
(interpreting GA. CODE ANN. § 23-2311 (1962) and holding that trust income payable to
a child is to be used first to discharge the obligation of support). For example, children
may have their own funds where property has been left in trust by a grandparent for the
benefit of a grandchild or the child is an independently wealthy actor.
104. See supra note 95. A trustee could use this argument to set aside a debtor's dis-
claimer where the trustee otherwise might not be able to prove collusion. See, e.g.,
Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Gift to Defeat the Claims of Devisee's Creditors, 43
YALE L.J. 1030, 1032 (1934) (stating"[w]hile in a family affair of this nature it would be
practically impossible to show the existence of actual collusion among beneficiaries un-
der the will sufficient to estop the renunciation, it is difficult to believe that a tacit un-
derstanding of some sort did not exist").
105. 476 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1973).
106. The state statutory relation-back provision then in effect treated a disclaimant as
predeceased if the disclaimer had been made within six months from the time that the will
was admitted to probate. After that period, the disclaimer was treated as a conveyance.
See id. at 840-41 (discussing COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-43 (1963) as amended in 1965).
107. Id. at 839.
108. Id. These facts meet two of the conditions of a fraudulent transfer under Code §
548(a)(2). See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A), (B)(i) (1988).
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of that date.' 0 9 The court reasoned that the disclaimer would be
deemed a "transfer" if it effectively transferred property from the
debtor to his children." ° However, the court noted that under state
law the debtor did not have any interest to transfer because the "right to
succession by will of property" exists solely by state statutory enact-
ment, and the state may therefore limit or place conditions upon the
debtor's exercise of this right."' Thus, relying on the relation-back
provision, the court held that there had not been a fraudulent trans-
fer.'' 2
In contrast to the majority opinion in Hoecker, Judge Holloway's
dissent focused on the word "transfer" within the meaning of
Bankruptcy Act section 67(d)(2), the bankruptcy statute then in ef-
fect. 1 3 He pointed out that although the majority conceded that the
meaning of the word "transfer" was governed by federal law, it
nonetheless found no fraudulent transfer because the state legislature
clearly intended the disclaimer to relate back and not to operate as a
transfer.' Judge Holloway noted, however, that "transfer" in the
bankruptcy context is used in "its most comprehensive sense."' 1. He
interpreted the state disclaimer statute as giving the debtor "a limited
power . .. to control the passing" of his devise, a power which
seemed to be a "'mode, direct or indirect' of ... parting with [an] in-
terest in the property and hence a transfer."'1 6 The dissent further
stated that for cases arising under the Act, Congress intended to have
uniform application of the law in every state.' 7 Therefore, as Judge
Holloway demonstrated, we should not disfranchise creditors on the
109. Hoecker, 476 F.2d at 839.
110. Id. at 840-41.
I11. Id. at 841 (citing Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 48
(1944)).
112. Id. at 841.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a) (1970), the predecessor to Code § 548, provided that
"every transfer made ... by a debtor within one year prior to the filing of a petition...
is fraudulent ... if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is or will
be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual intent." Because §
548(a)(2)(A) and § 548 (a)(2)(B)(i) are similar, Hoecker is persuasive authority for cases
decided under the Code.
114. In the alternative, the majority opinion's language seems to indicate that it de-
cided that the state statute did not create an interest of the debtor in property, and that the
debtor therefore had nothing to transfer. Hoecker, 476 F.2d at 841.
115. Id. at 842 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Holloway, J., dissenting) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-43(2)(a)
(1963) as amended in 1965).
117. Id. (Holloway, J., dissenting) (citing McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S.
365, 369-70 (1945)).
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basis of a state provision not originally enacted to yield this result." 8
D. The Conflict Between Federal and State Law in Defining "Interest
of the Debtor in Property"
In his dissent in Hoecker, Judge Holloway noted the conflict be-
tween state and federal law arising from the Code's failure to define
"interest of the debtor in property" as used in section 548.119 The ab-
sence of a definition in the Code has led courts to consult state law for
a definition. 20 Giving effect to state relation-back provisions, how-
ever, has the effect of circumventing two of the Code's foremost goals:
fair treatment of creditors and the prevention of debtor dissipation of
the bankruptcy estate.' 2'
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where there is a conflict
between state and federal law, federal law must control. 22 In Perez v.
Campbell, 23 for example, the Court struck down a state statute that
permitted restrictions on driving privileges for those who did not pay
auto-accident judgments, even though the debts had been discharged in
bankruptcy. 124 The Court reasoned that the state's interest in highway
safety was insufficient where the statute frustrated the Code's "fresh
start" policy for discharged debtors. 25 Similarly, in Board of Trade v.
Johnson,126 the Court held that a seat on the Chicago Board of Trade
constituted "property" for the purposes of federal law, stating:
[W]here the bankrupt [sic] law deals with property rights
118. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
119. Hoecker, 476 F.2d at 842 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
120. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (noting that "[p]roperty in-
terests are created and defined by state law"); see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
541.02[1], at 541-10.1 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993) ("[T]he existence and na-
ture of the debtor's interest in property ... are determined by nonbankruptcy law.") The
Butner court carved out an exception, however, where "some federal interest [such as that
in a bankruptcy proceeding] requires a different result." 440 U.S. at 55.
121. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934) (stating that state law
in Hunt would have circumvented the federal "fresh-start" policy and holding that "[local
rules subversive [to federal bankruptcy policy] cannot be accepted as controlling the ac-
tion of a federal court"). Two of the Code's primary goals are treating creditors with like
claims similarly, see In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 991 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1990), and granting debtors a "fresh start." See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286
(1991).
122. See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text. See generally, David E. Leigh,
Note, Renunciation of a Legacy or Devise as a Fraudulent Transfer under the Bankruptcy
Act, 49 IND. L.J. 290 (1974).
123. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
124. Id. at 656.
125. Id. at 645-47, 648, 654 (citations omitted).
126. 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
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which are regulated by the state law, the federal courts in
bankruptcy will follow the state courts; but when the language of
Congress indicates a policy requiring a broader construction of
the [Bankruptcy Act] than the state decisions would give it, fed-
eral courts cannot be concluded by them.1
27
Fair treatment of creditors and the maintenance of the debtor's estate
are vital policies which the federal courts should support by ignoring
state relation-back provisions in cases where debtors file disclaimers
during the year prior to filing their bankruptcy petitions.
In Glosband v. Watts Detective Agency Inc., 28 the court looked to
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to define the term "property."'129
Specifically, the court examined this term "as invoked in the definition
of a 'transfer' in the context of former 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a)'s
proscription of fraudulent transfers.'0 30 The court noted that "prop-
erty" in this context "'is necessarily a federal question'"'" and held
that "property" includes "anything of value which but for the transfer
might have been preserved for the trustee to the ultimate benefit of the
[debtor's] creditors.' 3 2 Property that is subject to the debtor's power
to accept or disclaim clearly falls within this definition. Thus, giving
effect to the relation-back provision yields a narrower definition of the
term "interest in property" than the one that federal courts have given
that term as used in section 548.
Furthermore, section 541(a)(1) of the Code is intended to include in
the "estate" all property made available to the estate pursuant to other
Code sections 3 so that all the debtor's "property" is available to sat-
isfy creditor claims. For example, section 548 empowers the trustee to
demand all property that the debtor fraudulently transferred. 34 All
property that the trustee recovers pursuant to section 548 becomes
127. Id. at 10 (citing Board of Trade v. Weston, 243 F. 332 (7th Cir. 1917)).
128. 21 B.R. 963 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
129. Id. at 971.
130. Id. II U.S.C. § 107(d) (1970) is the predecessor to 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
131. Glosband, 21 B.R. at 971 (quoting McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365,
370 (1945)).
132. Id.
133. See United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 205 (1983) (holding that §
542(a) "requires an entity ... holding any property of the debtor that the trustee can use
under § 363 to turn that property over to the trustee").
134. Technically, § 548 only empowers the trustee to avoid the debtor's fraudulent
transfers, whereas § 551 automatically preserves any fraudulently transferred property
for the benefit of the estate, and § 550 authorizes the trustee to recover the property from
the transferee. II U.S.C. §§ 550, 551 (1988). Nevertheless, § 548 gives the trustee the
power to ultimately recapture property that the debtor fraudulently transfers.
1993]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
"property of the estate."' 35 Because section 541 specifically sets forth
the property that constitutes the estate, including property recovered
under section 548, section 541 should control in defining the "interest
of the debtor in property" for the purpose of determining which prop-
erty the debtor "becomes entitled to acquire.., by bequest, device, or
inheritance."'36
E. Uniformity in Bankruptcy Proceedings
One of the Code's purposes is uniformity in bankruptcy proceed-
ings.'3 7 Where bankruptcy courts apply state law in the disclaimer
context, the Code's goal of uniformity is defeated because the different
treatment of disclaimers under state law yields inconsistent results
among the jurisdictions. 3 8 In a probate proceeding, personal property
of the decedent generally passes under the laws of the state in which
the decedent was domiciled at death. In contrast, real property gener-
ally passes under the law of the state in which the property is lo-
cated. 3 9 The disclaimer's effectiveness, therefore, may depend upon
the laws of more than one state.
Currently, four states have statutory provisions that preclude dis-
claimers by insolvent beneficiaries, 40 and two states have such rules
by court decision.' 4' Thus, if a disclaimer affects both property lo-
cated in one of these six states and property located elsewhere, credi-
tors may be able to reach only part of the property. More importantly,
under section 544(b) of the Code, a trustee can set aside any transfer of
an interest in property of the debtor that is voidable under applicable
state law. Therefore, federal proceedings in which the trustee invokes
section 544 will produce divergent results based on the statutory pro-
visions of the particular jurisdiction. To avoid this potential inconsis-
tency, courts should define the phrase "interest of the debtor in
135. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3)-(4) (1988).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A) (1988).
137. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
138. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 ("Uniform treatment of property interests by both
state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, [and] to discourage fo-
rum shopping.").
13 9. See generally McGOVERN, supra note 1.
140. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.801(6)(a) (West Supp. 1993); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
1021 (West 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191A, § 8(2) (West Supp. 1993); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 525.532 (Subdiv. 6) (West Supp. 1993).
141. Cf. Stein v. Brown, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 & n.1 (Ohio 1985) (dicta, as the
court invalidated the beneficiary's disclaimer based on its finding of actual intent to de-
fraud creditors); Butcher v. Butcher (In re Estate of Reed), 566 P.2d 587, 591 (Wyo.
1977) (finding actual intent to defraud). For a more thorough discussion of Stein and
Butcher, see infra notes 148-50, 151-53.
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property," as used in section 548, by reference to section 541.
One context in which state disclaimer law has been wholly pre-
empted by federal legislation is section 2518 of the Internal Revenue
Code ("I.R.C."). To avoid gift tax consequences to the disclaimant,
the disclaimant must meet certain I.R.C. requirements, regardless of
the effectiveness of the disclaimer under state law.' 42 In McDonald v.
Commissioner, 143 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the
application of the gift tax to a disclaimer by stressing that a disclaimer,
"which is an indirect transfer, would fall within the encompassing lan-
guage of the gift tax statute."'" Given the striking similarity between
the relevant definitions of "transfer" in the I.R.C. and the Bankruptcy
Code, 145 courts should interpret the word "transfer" as it applies to
disclaimers in the bankruptcy context in the same way that the Eighth
Circuit construed "transfer" in the tax context. Giving effect to the le-
gal fiction of relation back in all bankruptcy cases provides the debtor
with too great an opportunity to abuse her right to disclaim property."
The I.R.C. provides the taxpayer nine months from the date of
transfer to disclaim the gift and avoid taxation. Courts should interpret
the Bankruptcy Code as doing the same with respect to fraudulent
transfers in section 548, except that the time frame for disclaiming
should be one year instead of nine months. Specifically, if a dis-
claimer is executed more than one year prior to the date on which a
petition is filed, courts should treat the disclaimant as predeceased. In
this situation, the disclaimer is not a fraudulent transfer, and the prop-
erty does not become "property of the estate." If the debtor disclaims
an interest during the year prior to the date on which the petition is
filed, however, the courts should classify the disclaimer as a fraudulent
transfer, just as the transfer would be subject to gift tax if the taxpayer
142. 26 U.S.C. § 2518 (1988).
143. 853 F.2d 1494 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989).
144. Id. at 1499 (emphasis added). In discussing the treatment of similar terms under
the I.R.C., the court further stated:
Federal gift tax is imposed "on the transfer of property by gift." 26 U.S.C. §
2501(a)(1). The scope of this tax is broad, applying "whether the transfer is
in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the
property is real or personal, tangible or intangible." 26 U.S.C. § 2511(a).
Moreover, in construing the gift tax provisions, "[t]he terms 'property,'
'transfer,' 'gift,' and 'indirectly' are used in the broadest and most comprehen-
sive sense; the term 'property' reaching every species of right or interest pro-
tected by law and having an exchangable [sic] value."
Id. (citations omitted).
145. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1988) with the definition of "transfer" in the
I.R.C. set forth in McDonald.
146. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
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executed a disclaimer more than nine months after the date of transfer.
The federal government's policy of uniformity in the area of federal
taxation should also apply to federal bankruptcy proceedings. Current
case law, however, is split on this issue.
F. State Cases
Although the majority of state cases permit a disclaimer regardless of
motive or the presence of creditors, 47 two cases decided under state
law have held that disclaimers are ineffective where a debtor is liable to
creditors. In Stein v. Brown,148 a drunk driver who was sued for
wrongful death disclaimed a bequest under his brother's will of
approximately $100,000. Relying on In re Kalt's Estate, 149 the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the "power to vest title in another is the
equivalent of a transfer of that property" and thus set aside the dis-
claimer under the state fraudulent conveyances statute. 5 ° Similarly, in
In re Estate of Reed,'5' the Wyoming Supreme Court, also relying on
In re Kalt's Estate, held that a disclaimer executed on the same day that
a court entered a judgment against the disclaimant could be set aside as
a fraudulent transfer. Like the Stein court, the Reed court focused on
the timing of the disclaimer and on evidence that the disclaimant
received no consideration for its execution.5 2 From these "badges of
fraud," the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish
the disclaimant's actual intent to defraud the judgment creditor. 5 3
Thus, in an effort to act equitably, some courts circumvent the majority
position by identifying how the disclaimant's actions demonstrate
"fraudulent intent" and declare the disclaimer a transfer.5 4 Although
the results in Stein and Reed were indeed equitable under the circum-
stances, in the absence of Code policy, they are difficult to justify in
light of state relation-back provisions.
147. See supra notes 18-19.
148. 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1122 (Ohio 1985).
149. Kalt v. Youngworth (In re Kalt's Estate), 108 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1940); see also
supra notes 74-82.
150. Stein, 480 N.E.2d at 1123. In a bankruptcy case relying on Stein, the court in
McGraw v. Betz (In re Betz), 84 B.R. 470, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987), held that a
post-petition disclaimer by a debtor could be set aside under state law.
151. Butcher v. Butcher (In re Estate of Reed), 566 P.2d 587, 590-91 (Wyo. 1977).
152. Id. at 590.
153. Id. at 591. Some state statutes specifically prohibit disclaimers in cases in
which a creditor has already levied against the disclaimant's inheritance. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 3B:9-9(a) (West Supp. 1993).
154. See, e.g., Reed, 566 P.2d at 590.
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G. Cases Under the Code
An early Code case, In re Peery,155 was the first to take a position
contrary to Hoecker and hold that a pre-petition disclaimer could be a
fraudulent transfer.' 56 In Peery, the debtor received a devise of real
estate worth $168,000 under his grandfather's will. 57 Substantially
indebted to the plaintiff bank, the debtor disclaimed the property six
days after the bank filed a collection action and ten months before he
filed a Chapter 7 petition.'58
The Peery court applied a four-part test to determine whether a dis-
claimer was a fraudulent transfer. First, the court inquired whether the
devise was "property of the debtor."'59 This question, the court rea-
soned, was determined by state law, which defined an "interest in
property" as "the right to control, direct or receive a testamentary dis-
tribution."'6° Second, the court asked whether there had been a "trans-
fer of property."' 6' In looking to section 101(41),62 the court
reasoned that the disclaimer was a "completely voluntary transfer" of
the right to receive the distribution. 63 Third, the court examined
whether the transfer occurred within one year of the filing for
bankruptcy. 64 The debtor argued that the relation-back provision in
the state statute controlled, and that the one-year period should there-
fore be measured from the date of the testator's death instead of from
the date on which the debtor disclaimed. 65 The court disagreed,
stating that for bankruptcy purposes, the state legislature does not
regulate the date of transfer. 66 Thus, the Peery court held that
155. Nashville City Bank & Trust Co. v. Peery (In re Peery), 40 B.R. 811 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1984).
156. Id. at 812-13, 816.
157. Id. at 812.
158. Id. at 812-13.
159. Id. at 813.
160. Peery, 40 B.R. at 813. The court explained that under Tennessee law, the right
to receive real property by testamentary distribution attaches on the date of the testator's
death. Id. Looking to Code § 541, the court also noted that the meaning of "property"
under the Code was intended to be "virtually all encompassing." Id. at 813-14 n.4
(citing United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204 (1982)). See also case cited
supra note 128.
161. Peery, 40 B.R. at 814.
162. The term "transfer" is currently defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1988). See
supra note 55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Code's definition of "trans-
fer."
163. Peery, 40 B.R. at 814 (citing Schaefer v. Fisher, 242 N.Y.S. 308, 314 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1930)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 815. The court stated:
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although "[r]enunciation may be 'effective' for purposes of state law as
of the date of the testator's death . . . the 'transfer' of the debtor's
rights and interests for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code took place on
the date of the renunciation. '"167
Finally, to determine whether the debtor intended to defraud his
creditors, the court inquired whether various "badges" of fraud were
present.168 The court considered, inter alia, the timing of and absence
of consideration for the disclaimer, the relationship between the debtor
and the transferee, and the existence of a collection suit against the
debtor. 69 From these various "badges" of fraud, the court concluded
that the debtor intended to defraud his creditors 7 ° and that the debtor's
pre-petition disclaimer was therefore a fraudulent transfer.17 1
In In re Stevens, 72 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas reached the same result. The court held that the dis-
claimer constituted a "transfer" and that the transfer occurred on the
date of the disclaimer, 73 even though Texas law holds that property
devised by will vests immediately in the devisee upon the date of
death. 74  Although this holding apparently put state and federal
bankruptcy law at odds, there was no actual conflict: federal
bankruptcy law determined whether the debtor had transferred that in-
terest, 75 whereas in both Peery and Stevens, state law merely de-
termined that the debtor had an "interest in property" that he had the
power to transfer. The majority of states, including Tennessee, 76 now
provide that property does not vest in the devisee upon the death of the
testator but is subject to disclaimer. 177 Therefore, unless federal policy
The Tennessee relation back statute does not erase the fact of a transfer of the
debtor's vested rights at the time of the renunciation. Instead, relation-back is
a legal fiction which defines the consequences of having property rights vest
at death and then revest in others after a valid renunciation. Although relation-
back may have significant nonbankruptcy effects ...[l]egal fictions created
for other purposes by state law cannot be used to defeat the express limitations
periods created by the Bankruptcy Code.
Id.
167. Peery, 40 B.R. at 815.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 815-816.
170. Id. at 816.
171. Id.
172. Casciato v. Stevens (In re Stevens), 112 B.R. 175, 177-78 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1989).
173. Id. at 177 (citing Peery, 40 B.R. at 814).
174. Id. at 177.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
177. See Gamin, supra note 69, at 153 n.40.
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prevails in future decisions, the Stevens case may be the lone exception
to the majority rule.'78
In contrast, in In re Atchison,'79 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that since the Code does not define "interest of the debtor
in property," its definition must come from applicable state law. 8 °
The court further looked to state law, and specifically to the Illinois re-
lation-back provision,' 8' and concluded that the debtor did not have an
interest that could be subject to a transfer. 182 The Atchison court dis-
counted Peery because in that case, the court had looked to state law
for a definition of interest in property, but had ignored the relation-
back provision and treated it instead as a statute of limitations. 83
Noting that the Illinois statute provides that a disclaimer relates back
for "all purposes," the court held that the "relation-back doctrine
favors the right of beneficiaries to reject a gift over competing
interests."'' 84 This analysis, however, fails to account for the interests
of unsecured creditors. Only a debtor's assets which are not already
subject to a security interest can satisfy unsecured creditors' claims. If
courts ignore a disclaimer by the debtor during the year prior to the
filing of a petition, as they ignore post-petition disclaimers,85
unsecured creditors may have access to additional assets to satisfy their
claims. 8
6
A majority of the states, including Illinois, have abolished the doc-
trine of descent cast and now subject all property passing to a devisee
or heir to the recipient's right to disclaim. 187 The courts therefore must
178. New Hampshire and Mississippi also may not follow the majority rule. In those
states, if property is inherited, the doctrine of descent cast may treat the property as
vesting in the heir prior to the heir's execution of a disclaimer, thus giving rise to a
transfer. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 596 n.49.
179. Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 178 (1991).
180. Id. at 210 (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1978)).
181. ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 755, § 5/2-7(d) (1993).
182. Atchison, 925 F.2d at 211 (citing Hoecker v. United Bank of Boulder, 476 F.2d
838 (10th Cir. 1973)). Although Hoecker was decided under the Act, Congress did not
make any substantive changes to the fraudulent transfer section when it enacted the Code
in 1978. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988) with 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976).
183. Atchison, 925 F.2d at 211.
184. Id. The court further observed that permitting the disclaimer to relate back to the
testator's death "does not unfairly prejudice creditors." Id. However, the court over-
looked the general proposition that state law should be disregarded where some federal
interest, such as the protection of creditors under the Code, requires a different result.
185. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
186. The Atchison decision is also troubling because the disclaimed property passed
to the disclaimant's children. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 1.
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choose between allowing state law to control, as in Atchison, or treat-
ing the power to disclaim as an interest in property,'88 and ignoring the
legal fiction of relation back in federal bankruptcy proceedings. 8 9 A
power to disclaim is a substantial property interest, and when it is used
to shield property from creditors, courts should recognize that a
fraudulent transfer has occurred so that the disclaimed property may be
recovered for the estate and used to satisfy the claims of creditors.
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting section 541 (a), Congress intended to capture all interests
of the debtor, including "powers" to satisfy claims of creditors.
Courts have held that disclaimers are voidable as post-petition transfers
because the power to disclaim or accept a devise is included in "prop-
erty of the estate" and is exercisable only by the trustee.' 9° Section 548
seems to embody a goal similar to that of section 54 1(a): the preven-
tion of the dissipation of the debtor's assets. The only difference be-
tween the two provisions is that at the time of a pre-petition disclaimer
there is no property of the estate and no trustee. It does not make
sense to assume that a debtor is entitled to certain property devised to
him, to have that entitlement disclaimed, and to pretend that there has
been no transfer in spite of the debtor's efforts.
On the other hand, had Congress intended to capture this particular
power under section 548, it could have done so by referring to section
541 in section 548 for the definition of "interest in property." Even in
the absence of such a definition, however, courts should rule in favor
of creditors and should not permit debtors to shield their assets through
the use of disclaimers.
188. Defining an interest in property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541 protects the credi-
tor because Congress intended this provision to be read expansively. It includes prop-
erty over which the debtor has a general power of appointment. See supra notes 74-79
and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 155-60, 166 and accompanying text.
190. In all Chapter 13 cases and some Chapter 11 cases, a debtor-in-possession may
continue to operate a business that, along with the debtor's personal assets, is included
in the bankruptcy estate. It is presumed that judicial mechanisms will compel the debtor
to accept the devise or inheritance.
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